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Policy Points:
 Examining the reasons for the failure of 20th-century syphilis eradica-
tion programs (difficulties in finding cases, tracing contacts, procuring
consistent funding, overcoming moral framing, and rectifying social
problems that create vulnerable environments) provides insight into
the possibility that today’s UNAIDS campaign may not achieve its
goal.
 Disease eradication, although applicable to smallpox, may not be a
realistic goal for public health officials who are designing programs to
control sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) like AIDS. STDs such as
AIDS have a distinctive array of socioeconomic, behavioral, biologic,
and epidemiologic features that may not make these diseases amenable
to eradication.
Context: Throughout its course, there has been talk of ending the AIDS epi-
demic. Initially aspirational in nature, this discourse has now taken the form of
an explicit UNAIDS proposal to maximize the number of infected people who
are tested and receive antiretroviral treatment (ART). If the milestones are met
by 2020, the proposal states, an end to the AIDS pandemic could be achieved
by 2030. This article uses a historical approach to explore whether this strategy
to end the epidemic is feasible.
Methods: In this article, I identify historical analogues of today’s UNAIDS plan
for STDs. I then examine features of today’s HIV campaign and compare them
with elements of syphilis eradication campaigns that carried out widespread
testing and treatment between the 1930s and 1960s.
Findings: Twentieth-century syphilis campaigns failed because they did not is-
sue specific proposals that would enable them to achieve their eradication goal.
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They could not change the features of the disease that impeded their test-and-
treat strategy: the moral framing (stigma deters people from testing), biologic
factors (asymptomatic periods of contagiousness), and epidemiologic issues (dif-
ficulty tracking contacts occurring in private settings). Furthermore, they could
not ensure sustainable funding, rectify social problems that create vulnerable
environments, or issue educational messages to curb unsafe behaviors. Today’s
UNAIDS campaign offers no new provisions to address those factors that led to
the failure of earlier syphilis campaigns.
Conclusions: The distinctive array of socioeconomic, biologic, and epidemi-
ologic factors that characterize STDs like syphilis also apply to AIDS and
weaken the assumption that the AIDS epidemic can be ended by implementing
today’s UNAIDS plan. The discourse of ending the AIDS epidemic may be a
carryover from the successful elimination, before the appearance of AIDS, of
smallpox—a disease that is not comparable to AIDS owing to different biologic
qualities, social concerns, epidemiologic behaviors, and the possession of an
effective vaccine. Future AIDS control campaigns should therefore concentrate
on maximizing ART distribution and not targeting the end of the epidemic.
Keywords: syphilis, venereal, AIDS, eradication.
T he “90-90-90” plan issued by the Joint UN Program onHIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) has set an admittedly “ambitious” goal ofending the AIDS epidemic by 2030.∗ The plan seeks to achieve
this goal by optimizing the number of cases detected and entered into
effective treatment.1 Specifically, by 2020, 90% of people living with
HIV should be diagnosed; 90% of HIV-infected patients diagnosed
should be receiving antiretroviral treatment (ART); and at least 90%
of those on ART should achieve viral suppression. The end target is
to obtain an undetectable viral load in 73% (26.9 million) of the 37
million HIV-infected patients globally by 2020 and to sustain this for
one decade. Citing mathematical modeling predictions, the plan states
it will achieve “nothing less than the end of the AIDS epidemic by 2030”
if its target milestones are reached.1
∗In the 1930s and 1960s, the term “eradication” was used to describe the
reduction or elimination of an epidemic as a public health hazard. While more
recently, “eradication” is used to mean the reduction of disease to zero, I use the
term in this paper with respect to how it was used by historic figures quoted.
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Public health experts and government officials are hopeful that the
UNAIDS goals can be attained. They are heartened by the tangible
progress already made in the fight against AIDS by expanding ART on a
global basis.2 Noting that between 2000 and 2015, new HIV infections
fell by 35%, AIDS-related deaths decreased by 42%, and life expectancy
has been restored in several sub-Saharan African nations, epidemiologist
Gerald Friedland considers the expansion of ART to be “a historic turn of
events . . . [and] one of the greatest scientific, medical and public health
realignment of resources between rich and poor.”3(p145) The conviction of
experts that HIVmay be defeated has now been embraced by the general
public. In his State of the Union address on January 13, 2016, President
Barak Obama compared the goal of HIV eradication with President
John F. Kennedy’s legendary 1961 prediction that a man would land
on the moon within a decade. Obama’s analogy is clear: the seemingly
improbable can be reached if one has the will, the technology, and the
appropriate commitment of resources. Obama and the audience were
inspired by the prospect of conquering AIDS. As he said to rousing
applause, “Right now, we’re on track to end the scourge of HIV/AIDS.
That’s within our grasp.”4
Public health experts are, nonetheless, uncertain about whether the
UNAIDS goals can be met by 2030. Their concerns are based on how
far away we are presently from reaching the 90-90-90 milestones.3 In
fact, of all HIV-positive people around the world today, only 54% have
been diagnosed; 76% of those are being treated; and 78% of those re-
ceiving ART have undetectable HIV viral load.5 Thus, only 32% of
the global HIV-infected population (11.6 million) presently have viral
suppression—15.3 million below the 26.9-million milestone (73% of
HIV-infected people) that needs to be reached by 2020.5 In addition,
because ART remains a lifelong therapy, challenges of linkage to care,
medicine adherence, and loss to follow-up all impinge on sustained
viral suppression.6,7 Furthermore, because UNAIDS does not provide
subsidies, it is unclear whether the projected incremental costs of ap-
proximately $7 billion per year (from the current $13 billion per year
rising to an estimated $20 billion per year) that will be required to
achieve the 90-90-90 goals will be bearable.8 Finally, it remains to be
seen whether the political will of local and international communities
needed to support the plan can be sustained for the long term.8 For these
reasons, some experts are uncertain whether we are indeed on the path of
ending the HIV epidemic within the UNAIDS specified time frame.3,9
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Can historic analogues provide insight into these uncertainties sur-
rounding the attainability of today’s UNAIDS campaign to end the
AIDS epidemic? This article examines 20th-century campaigns to erad-
icate syphilis from the 1930s to the 1960s to inform us about the
feasibility and possible limitations of the current UNAIDS plan to end
AIDS. It also addresses the larger question of whether it is appropriate
to design campaigns to end epidemics of sexually transmitted diseases
(STDs) like syphilis and HIV.
The UNAIDS Plan to End the AIDS
Epidemic: A Departure From Earlier
Efforts to Control HIV
The 2013UNAIDS 90-90-90 plan differs from earliermovements to end
theHIV epidemic in that it is based on the premise put forth in 2011 that
ART—as a result of suppressing viral load in blood, semen, and vaginal
secretions—essentially renders a patient noninfectious.10 This finding
supported the idea that the benefit of ART could extend to the public
health realm, a concept termed “treatment as prevention.”11 A “test-and-
treat” strategy based on this premise then emerged to identify as many
infected, untreated persons as possible and to treat them until they no
longer were infectious.12 The premise of this strategy was bolstered by a
mathematical modeling prediction that universal HIV testing combined
with ART for those who tested positive could nearly abolish AIDS
within 50 years.13 In 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton speculated
on the potential of maximizing ART globally to “set the stage for
a historic opportunity . . . to change the course of this pandemic and
usher in an AIDS-free generation.”14 Clinton was contemplating what
might be possible if ART were to be optimized; she did not propose
to end the AIDS epidemic per se.15 The 90-90-90 plan issued in 2013
is based on a similar “treatment as prevention” premise and shares
the same “test-and-treat” strategy as Clinton’s “AIDS-free generation”
speculation. Unlike Clinton’s idea, however, today’s UNAIDS plan lays
out explicit milestones for ART coverage and an expedited time line for
ending the epidemic set by the UN Sustainable Development Goal to
improve global health over a 15-year span.16 Today’s UNAIDS plan is
the first campaign to declare an explicit time line for ending the HIV
epidemic and to provide specific milestones and targets for testing and
suppressing HIV viral load with treatment.
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The UNAIDS 90-90-90 program also differs from earlier UNAIDS
treatment programs. UNAIDS efforts began in the early 2000s when of-
ficials began to argue that the response to HIV had been inadequate
at the international level.17 Their advocacy to make ART available
to HIV-infected individuals worldwide was prompted by disparities
between the large numbers of people who continued to die worldwide
and the abrupt decline in mortality from AIDS in developed countries
after the introduction of ART in 1996. UN officials contended that
it was a violation of human rights not to provide lifesaving ART to
people living in developing countries because they were at an economic
disadvantage.18 To distribute ART to low- or medium-income nations,
donor countries agreed to provide large amounts of foreign aid and re-
duce drug prices through generic programs and the restructuring of
intellectual property rights.19 UNAIDS followed by issuing propos-
als to expand ART coverage to people living in low-income countries
throughout the world—first the “3 by 5” initiative (provide ART to
3 million by 2005) and then the MDG Goal 6A “15 by 15” plan (place
15 million on ART by 2015).20,21 These programs succeeded in meet-
ing their numerical goals, with ART coverage increasing from 800,000
people in 2003 to the current number of 17 million.22 In contrast to
these earlier UNAIDS efforts, scaling up ART in the current 90-90-90
campaign is not specified as a goal in itself but as a means to achieving
the goal of ending the AIDS epidemic.
The 90-90-90 plan’s emphasis on maximizing testing and contact
tracing also is a departure from earlier approaches to handlingHIV. In the
mid-1980s, an approach that Ronald Bayer termed “AIDS exceptional-
ism” emerged.23,24 At that time, gay activists worried that a positive test
would be used for discrimination in housing and employment and that
mandatory testing and contact tracing would violate their civil liberties
and could deprive them of their livelihoods. Some gay statesmen from
the Gay Men’s Health Crisis in New York and other advocacy groups
supported voluntary and anonymous testing and counseled members of
their community to behave responsibly.25 These arguments prevailed in
the courts, which required that informed consent be obtained for testing,
a requirement different from that for other STDs. The additional steps
required to obtain informed consent, however, became a disincentive for
clinicians to test and a deterrent to the widespread case finding that
had been the backbone of previous public health campaigns.26 After the
introduction of ART, the informed consent and anonymous testing that
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in the 1980s had been seen as championing the civil rights of individuals
became viewed as potentially detrimental to overall public health.26,27
Today’s 90-90-90 campaign, with its emphasis on widespread testing
and extensive contact tracing, represents a departure from the more
restrictive testing approach that characterized the early phase of the
AIDS epidemic.
Today’s UNAIDS campaign also differs from earlier discourses to end
AIDS. Discussions of abolishing HIV emerged in 1984 when Margaret
Heckler, then secretary of health and human services, joined Robert
Gallo, a virologist at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), at a
conference where he announced the discovery of the virus that causes
AIDS and predicted that “a vaccine [for this dread affliction] would be
ready for testing within 2 years.”28(p18) These hopes culminated in 1998
when President Bill Clinton channeled federal funds for a dedicated
new AIDS vaccine research center (VRC) at NIH and set an ambitious
goal to manufacture an effective AIDS vaccine. As Clinton stated, “Only
an effective HIV vaccine can . . . eliminate the threat of AIDS. . . .
Let us commit ourselves to developing an AIDS vaccine within the
next decade.”29 At the address, Clinton compared his proposal with
the determined goal that President Kennedy set in 1961 of reaching
the moon.29 Heckler’s comments in 1984 and Clinton’s predictions in
1997 underscore their abiding faith in biomedicine to end epidemic
disease. Their comments also indicate that in the earlier stage of the
AIDS epidemic, talk of ending HIV was essentially aspirational, as they
lacked a specific tool in hand to accomplish their goal.
Today’s 90-90-90 plan has transformed the aspirational nature of the
earlier discourse of ending HIV into an explicit proposal to use currently
available therapies to end the AIDS epidemic within an expedited time
frame. The key elements of today’s UNAIDS plan are similar to those
of 2, pre-AIDS, 20th-century campaigns to end the epidemic of another
STD: syphilis.
A Historic Analogue for UNAIDS
Movement: 20th-Century Syphilis
Campaigns
Syphilis is an appropriate analogue for HIV because the two STDs have
comparable features. Medically, the two have an array of nonspecific
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manifestations that can mimic, and be difficult to distinguish from,
other conditions. Biologically, both have a long period of asymptomatic
infection during which time the individual is highly contagious and
may be unaware that he or she can transmit infection. Since sexual
contact occurs privately, partner identification is dependent on disclosure
by the individual. Furthermore, case finding may be difficult because
people may be reluctant to reveal the names of their intimate contacts to
strangers or hesitate to be tested themselves because of stigma associated
with the moral framing of each disease. In addition, social problems
that displace individuals from their social network—during wars, nat-
ural disasters, or migrant work; along with poverty, joblessness, wealth
imbalance, and prostitution—create a ready environment for the spread
of each infection. Moreover, several components of earlier syphilis erad-
ication programs are similar to those of the UNAIDS 90-90-90 plan.
The earliest 20th-century syphilis control program employed a test-
and-treat strategy duringWorldWar I. Armed with Paul Ehrlich’s 1910
discovery of salvarsan (compound 606) to treat syphilis, the US secre-
tary of war, Newton Baker, initiated a campaign in 1918 to control
the disease that he believed could weaken America’s fighting troops.30
Congress, prompted by the need to keep the military fit for duty, passed
the Chamberlain–Kahn Act on July 9, 1918, which created the Divi-
sion of Venereal Disease (VD) Control in the US Public Health Service
(USPHS) and appropriated funds ($1 million per year for years 1919 and
1920) to subsidize state bureaus for VD control.30 The public regarded
the act as necessary to the war effort.31,32 The elements of this control
included the widespread availability of laboratory testing, the reporting
of cases, the tracing of contacts, and the provision of salvarsan.33 It also
established treatment facilities and a public education program run by
sexual hygienists that targeted sexual morality—eliminating promiscu-
ity and prostitution and restoring chastity.34 But the national effort and
funds began to be curtailed shortly after 1920 during the “returning
to normalcy” spirit that epitomized Warren Harding’s presidency.35(p85)
Noting that this funding was rescinded in 1926, Thomas Parran, a
USPHS officer who had been appointed chief of the Division of VD
Control, remarked that “the enthusiasm [to control syphilis] that had
gone up like a rocket came down like a stick.”35(p85) Parran pointed out
that when treatment was provided, the attack rate had declined, but
when the funding was rescinded, it relapsed.35(p131) In regard to syphilis
in the United States after World War I, he said, “No further thought
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was given to syphilis, and the first national public health effort came to
an untimely end.”35(p85) Parran lamented that syphilis had receded from
public consciousness following the war—a trend that had also occurred
in 1918 with influenza.
In 1936, after the governor of New York, Franklin D. Roosevelt, be-
came president of the United States, he appointed New York state health
commissioner, Thomas Parran, as the US surgeon general. Shortly after
assuming his position, Parran initiated a national eradication program
using treatments available at the time to prevent the spread of syphilis
after the war. He was determined to control syphilis at a time when it
was causing serious problems of disability, and the costs of its long-term
effects (eg, the commitment of those to a public institution because
of blindness or insanity or, while working on the public payroll, the
absenteeism or inability to complete tasks among those who had re-
lief jobs created by President Roosevelt’s Works Progress Association)
were conspicuous during the Great Depression nationwide36 (Figure 1).
In addition to the premature withdrawal of government funding, Par-
ran cited another reason for the resurgence of syphilis in America: the
moralistic way in which the disease had been approached by sexual
hygienists.37 Instead, Parran proposed a scientifically oriented plan based
on a treatment as prevention precept. He explained, “The backbone of
the whole control program [is that] treatment of all cases must be re-
quired in the public health interest to the point where each case becomes
noninfectious.”35(p254) Concluding that treatment provided a “duty to
the community,” he reasoned that the “non-infectiousness of the patient
is achieved by a few doses of arsphenamine. It is important from the
public health standpoint, since it means that one link in the chain of
infection has been broken.”35(p254) Parran based his premise on evidence
that following treatment, spirochetes from clinical specimens were poi-
soned and killed, thereby sterilizing open lesions.35(pp7,48,205,221,255) His
proposition that the patient became noninfectious once treatment had
diminished the presence of the microbe from relevant samples was, in
many respects, a conceptual precursor of today’s UNAIDS plan.
Parran proposed what he termed a “find-and-treat” strategy to
maximize case finding and to address the retention of patients in
clinic.35(pp7,48,205,221,255) The essence of Parran’s eradication strategy was
to use theWasserman serology to identify asmany cases as possible and to
treat all cases.35(pp26,255) He emphasized that even though doctors had the
scientific and medical means at hand to handle syphilis, carrying it out
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Figure 1. Syphilis: Menace to Industry, 1936-1940
This poster illustrates the importance to workers to maintain their
health and avoid contracting syphilis. Workers with syphilis who
develop complications with motor skills may lose their job and/or
be unable to complete their work duties, thereby compromising in-
dustrial productivity. Workers with syphilis can also harm others
if they cause an accident at work as a result of an impairment.
During the Great Depression, concerns about the national recovery
resonated with Americans. (Image from Erin Wuebker, Library of
Congress, Venereal Disease Visual History Archive, http://vdarchive.
newmedialab.cuny.edu/exhibits/show/exhibits/introduction.)
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would pose sizable, albeit surmountable, problems. He said, “The whole
control program of ‘find and treat’ is so deceptively simple that most
of its details are much more difficult than they sound. . . . The practice
is less simple but possible.”35(pp26,255) To overcome what he called the
“stumbling block” of case-finding, he recommended a universal, volun-
tary “Wasserman dragnet” be applied to capture the greatest percentage
of the population through available means: persons who were hospital-
ized, expectant mothers, those applying for marriage licenses, or those
undergoing exams for life insurance or by their family doctor.35(pp163,289)
This process, he believed, would capture persons without symptoms or
with nonspecific symptoms, and those who may not otherwise get tested
or be unwilling to reveal the identity of their sexual contacts because
of the stigma attached to syphilis.35(p283) To optimize the key elements
of his campaign—case finding, contact tracing, and reporting—Parran
stressed the importance of attaining the cooperation of private physi-
cians to overcome their reluctance to violate their patients’ privacy and
to report their cases to a public health officer.35(p245) Parran also stressed
the importance of retaining patients in clinical care to complete their
treatment with arsphenamine. Even though arsphenamine had fewer
side effects than its precursor drug salvarsan, completing the treatment
required to become noninfectious could be prolonged (up to 2 years), be
painful to the patient, require several office visits, and entail an expense
that many patients could not afford.35(p47) Parran nevertheless insisted
that patients must be held to a full-treatment schedule to reverse the
trend of the disease.35 Thus, on a strictly conceptual basis, the “find-and-
treat” component of Parran’s campaign can be considered a forerunner
of today’s UNAIDS plan to end the AIDS epidemic.
In order to place his campaign in the sphere of science and medicine,
Parran actively sought to reverse earlier anti-VD social hygienists’ em-
phasis on morality. He asked citizens to remove the stigma of talking
about syphilis openly in order to make the disease a political priority
and to receive financial support for its control, reasoning that an overly
moralistic attitude would hinder his campaign by compelling people to
conceal their disease and avoid using treatment facilities. He asserted
that Americans must think of syphilis scientifically as a dangerous com-
municable disease, just as they had done with typhoid, diphtheria, and
tuberculosis.35(p267) In fact, throughout his career, Parran had sustained
a scientific public health focus, as he had previously worked in Joseph
Kinyoun’s Hygienic Laboratory in Washington, DC, and had been
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assigned as a PHS officer to investigate outbreaks of diarrhea in ru-
ral America before he became chief of the USPHS DVD in 1926.38 By
insisting that people break their silence regarding syphilis, Parran was
attempting to transform the discourse of VD from a moral framework
into traditional medical and public health approaches.25(p141),39 He suc-
ceeded in removing the reluctance to talk about syphilis by writing in
popular magazines about the seriousness of the venereal problem to the
American public.37 He also addressed social problems that he believed
enabled the spread of syphilis: the problems of displaced populations,
urbanization, poverty, and income inequality that led to prostitution and
an environment vulnerable to the spread of syphilis.35(pp209-223) The pub-
lic’s response to Parran’s open discourse was highly supportive, matched
by strong backing from themedical and public health communities.40-44
After raising the public’s concern about syphilis as a national prob-
lem, Parran lobbied for federal funding of an eradication campaign. The
government, he reasoned, must provide money to retain people in care
who were unable to afford long-term treatments, to create free treat-
ment clinics, and to staff them with knowledgeable physicians.37 Public
expenditures to fight syphilis would, he said, save the nation money by
preventing the expense ofmanaging its chronic, disabling complications.
There was, he noted, precedence for the state’s providing funds to disrupt
the spread of other epidemics, like cholera and typhoid fever (eg, sanitary
measures, purification of water). Why, he asked, shouldn’t the state like-
wise support measures to halt the spread of America’s “most pressing”
health problem—syphilis?35(p56) To that end, he organized a USPHS na-
tional conference on VD control in Washington, DC, on December 28,
1936, at which more than 900 delegates (city health officers and public
health nurses) from 30 states supported the allocation of federal funds to
support an anti-VD campaign.45 Parran felt that arousing public inter-
est was key to getting the federal funding (from tax dollars) needed to
“stamp out” syphilis and bring “its epidemic aspects under control.”39(p3)
A receptive President Franklin D. Roosevelt responded in a message
sent to the conference: “The Federal Government is deeply interested
in . . . reducing the disastrous results of venereal disease,” and he also sup-
ported the provision of federal funds to be dispersed to the states to pre-
vent VD and reduce the amount of spending for the consequences of the
disease.41(p39)
With the advocacy of the surgeon general, the backing of the presi-
dent, and the arousal of the public’s attention, the federal government
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subsidized a national anti-VD program with the LaFollette–Bulwinkle
bill.46 Passed and signed into law by President Roosevelt on May 25,
1938, this bill, known as theNational VDControl Act, raised the federal
appropriation from $80,000 a year in 1936 to $3,080,000 in 1938, and
another $10 million to be split over the next 2 years.47 Congress autho-
rized the PHS to administer the grant by allocating funds to state boards
in response to summaries of each state’s VD control activities.25(p144) The
legislation also authorized 10% of the $8 million that had become avail-
able through Title VI of the 1936 Social Security Act to be channeled
to state boards to establish a comprehensive anti-VD program, to set up
diagnostic and treatment facilities, to train necessary personnel, and to
carry out testing and treatment.48(p95)
With federal funding now available to implement the widespread
testing and treatment he had been advocating, Parran believed he was
on the road to eradicating syphilis. Now that syphilis had been openly
addressed in the media as a disease to be eradicated through scientific
means and not as a moral infraction, and now that he had obtained fed-
eral funding for a coordinated national plan, he believed what he called
“the eradication equation” could be solved.35(p267) He noted that un-
like the United States, the Scandinavian countries had reduced syphilis
rates because they did not stigmatize the disease and they had a cen-
tral program of funding that ensured widespread testing and treatment
facilities.35(p159) Similarly, he believed that America now had the ele-
ments to solve what he termed the “equation of what is needed”:
teamwork of government, professions, industry, citizens + money
for drugs and facilities + trained personnel for finding and treating
cases = eradication of syphilis.35(p267)
Parran predicted that “the whole program to make syphilis a rare disease
. . . will take place in a generation.”35(pp287,296)
But Parran’s goal of a nation freed from syphilis never materialized.
For a brief period, some indicators suggested that his program was be-
ginning to work: clinic facilities for the treatment of VD had grown;
public subsidies provided practitioners with diagnostic and epidemio-
logic services, as well as free drugs; and the number of patients receiving
minimum required therapy increased from 15% to 60%.49 Nonethe-
less, despite Parran’s attempts to redefine the epidemic as a public
health menace that could be extinguished through modern scientific
approaches, these trends were short-lived, and syphilis rates failed to
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decline (from 318 cases per 100,000 in 1936 to 368 cases per 100,000
in 1941).35(p298),49 By 1941, with the onset ofWorldWar II, hundreds of
thousands of young men were displaced from their homes and mobilized
to army camps throughout the country, followed by prostitutes.47(p13),50
This was an environment that Parran himself had noted was conducive
to the spread of syphilis, and his attempts to optimize case finding
and enter all civilians into treatment proved ineffective under wartime
circumstances.
Later on during the war, the effort to control syphilis to preserve
able troops needed to defeat the enemy and to maintain a healthy civil-
ian population was reinvigorated. An increase in federal funding to
$8 million annually that began in 1942 allowed the addition of so-
called rapid treatment centers (RTCs) to ramp up the widespread sero-
logic testing, treatment, and contact tracing in order to meet wartime
needs, and by 1946 they had been established in 46 states.51 By 1944,
as John Parascandola notes, when the US Army adopted penicillin as
the routine treatment for syphilis, there was new hope that syphilis
among the troops might be controlled with the aid of the new “miracle
drug.”48(p130),52 With a new tool to fight syphilis—a one-shot cure that
could render a patient noninfectious—combinedwith an increase in gov-
ernment funds, the rates began to wane.When the decline persisted into
the 1950s (363 cases/100,000 in 1942 to 109/100,000 cases in 1952),
an article titled “The End of Syphilis in Sight” claimed that it would
not be long before medical students would have to consult textbooks to
obtain information about the disease.53 But with the falling rates during
postwar times, state and local health departments began to reduce their
support of the full-scale public health approach,51(p503) and the federal
appropriation of funds for VD control was cut from $9.8 million in
1953 to less than $2 million by 1955.54 These budget cuts were evi-
dent in the rise in rates of syphilis (from 66 cases/100,000 in 1954 to 78
cases/100,000 in 1959) whenVD control programs were forced to curtail
their comprehensive approach.51(p504) Noting the reversal in the down-
ward trends into the 1960s, Malcolm Merrill, director of the California
State Department of Health, remarked, “VD control nearly became an-
other victim of the rhetoric that all communicable disease had been
conquered.”55(p36)
Surgeon General Luther Terry responded to the continued rise
in syphilis rates by renewing the attack on VD in 1962. Terry, a
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pathologist, had previously served as chairman of the medical board
of the National Institutes of Health’s Clinical Center. There, he devel-
oped an interest in preventive measures that he later applied as surgeon
general in crusades against syphilis and cigarette smoking as public
health hazards.56 Terry appointed a task force to make recommenda-
tions on how to renew efforts to eradicate syphilis as a public health
problem, and in 1952, he appointed Leona Baumgartner, commissioner
of New York City’s Public Health Department, as its head. The de-
partment’s first woman commissioner, Baumgartner, a pediatrician, al-
ready had been carrying out municipal programs in disease prevention,
childhood nutrition, and treatment of VD.57 Her task force recom-
mended a comprehensive anti-VD plan that was derived from Parran’s
premise (treatment as prevention) and patterned after his design (test and
treat).58(pp1-30) Indeed, Baumgartner acknowledged that Parran’s 1930s
campaign was the model and inspiration for her recommendations.58(p8)
Baumgartner stressed that her plan would need to offer something
new in order to succeed. Previous campaigns, she believed, were never
able to overcome the obstacles to case finding that Parran had previously
identified: patients’ hesitancy to identify sexual partners and private
physicians’ reluctance to report cases of VD that they treated to public
health officials.59 An insufficient number of cases and their sexual con-
tacts created a large reservoir of unknown, uncontrolled, and untreated
cases, she maintained.55(p38) It was this reservoir—what she termed
the “margin of failure” of 40,000 or more cases—that was driving the
spread of the epidemic.58(p25) Baumgartner asserted that this “margin”
needed to be identified and treated. She also attributed the failure of
earlier syphilis campaigns to overhasty budget reductions.58(p5) William
Brown, chief of the Communicable Disease Center’s VD Branch, agreed
that past efforts had failed because funding was reduced before the epi-
demic had ended and because society was disinclined to bear that cost.60
Baumgartner concluded that unless she could add something new to
previous syphilis campaigns, her program would be nothing more than
“another crack at an old and familiar enemy.”59(p29) Malcolm Merrill
concurred, stating if they could not improve on earlier campaigns, “then
we shall have to live with this disease indefinitely.”55(p37)
Baumgartner and her task force sought to strengthen Parran’s meth-
ods of case finding, reporting, and tracing. She proposed widespread
premarital, preemployment, and prenatal testing, much like Parran’s
“Wasserman dragnet.”58 To maximize case finding, she and Warren
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Davis, chief of Program Services of the VD Branch of the Communica-
ble Disease Center, extended Parran’s contact-tracing efforts to include
“cluster contacts”: contacting acquaintances of patients, not only their
sexual contacts, to maximize the number of cases captured.58,61 Davis
also maintained that health care workers needed to pay more attention
to the psychological factors that prevented patients from divulging the
names of sexual contacts to a stranger. Furthermore, Baumgartner and
Rudolph Kampmeier, a professor of medicine at Vanderbilt Univer-
sity, noted that public officials had not been working well with private
doctors and private laboratories to perform adequate case reporting and
tracing.62 From the 1930s to the 1960s, the reporting capacity of diseases
to the national PHS had been strengthened by the introduction of the
Council for State and Territorial Epidemiologists—a body responsible
for deciding national notifiable diseases and updating case definitions.63
These developments, however, had not advanced the detection of syphilis
cases. Although Baumgartner discussed how to enhance case finding and
capture the “margin of error,” she did not provide any specific proposals
for actually carrying them out.
Baumgartner and Terry also addressed the social and economic con-
ditions responsible for the growing problem of syphilis. For example,
Baumgartner identified problems that she believed led to an increase
in the incidence of syphilis: mobility (creating more opportunities to
form casual sex relationships than possible in a small community) and
the breakdown of old cultural patterns and mores (children are less
closely supervised in cities than in small towns).64,65 Like Parran, how-
ever, she offered no proposals on how to rectify the course of the social
trends she identified.58(p23),65 Furthermore, Baumgartner addressed the
importance of sustained government funding to subsidize the costs of a
multifaceted syphilis control campaign.58(p10) But neither the surgeon
general nor the task force could offer any specific provisions to ensure
that this funding would continue throughout her campaign.
Baumgartner began to write articles in academic journals and popular
magazines to heighten public consciousness about syphilis as a growing
problem that needed to be confronted, funded, and controlled. Teenagers
in the 1960s, she noted, were brought up in the penicillin era and thus no
longer witnessed the death and insanity that had been common outcomes
of syphilis before penicillin.65 William Brown, of the Communicable
Disease Center’s VD Branch, believed that the increase in syphilis in
this group was based in part on the faith in penicillin of both the public
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and physicians to handle the disease.60 They believed that the largest
increase in syphilis was in young persons under age 24 who had become
familiar with the power of the one-shot penicillin cure of syphilis.60(p24)
Baumgartner believed that “less inhibition about sexual activity . . . es-
pecially among teenagers” could be rectified with educational messages
about the ravages of syphilis that she believed had previously served
as a deterrent to promiscuity.65 Like Parran, Baumgartner and Terry
took their anti-VD crusade and educational messages about the rising
incidence of syphilis to popular magazines to warn readers about the
dangers of syphilis and also to place the eradication of syphilis high on
the national agenda to obtain funding for her anti-VD program.64-67
Baumgartner’s open warnings of the dangers of syphilis had a favorable
response, as periodicals including Time, The Nation, The New Republic,
and Consumer Reports acknowledged the problem of syphilis and called
for something to be done by the medical and public health communities
to control the epidemic.67-73
After increasing public awareness of the dangers of syphilis, Terry
sought federal subsidies for his anti-VD program. Terry, like Parran,
maintained that he was justified in seeking federal funding for a social
problem that stemmed from a vulnerable environment rather than a
moral problem and a failure of individual will.54 With the advocacy
of the surgeon general, the Community Health Services and Facilities
Act, enacted by the 87th Congress, was signed into law by President
John F. Kennedy on October 5, 1961.54 It funded grants to the states
for the expansion of medical services facilities like nursing homes and
medical programs for general public health and outpatient services. It
also extended and strengthened the 1946 Hill–Burton Act that enabled
the federal government to provide funding to the states, especially for
the creation of new treatment clinics, which, according to Terry, were
vital to VD control.54 Based on the task force’s recommendations, these
federal funds were to be used for comprehensive national anti-VD ef-
forts, including medical services (diagnostic and treatment services and
facilities to find, diagnose, and treat individuals with syphilis), epi-
demiological services (officers trained to interview patients, to trace
their contacts, and to bring patients into treatment), and educational
activities.58(p19) The federal subsidies to control syphilis had increased
from $3 million per year in 1955 to $9.5 million in 1964.47(p144)
Without such a multifaceted, well-funded program, Baumgartner as-
serted, the epidemic would fester, as control efforts would be limited to
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“mere firefighting” that would be unable to “eliminate permanently the
conflagration.”58(p21)
Baumgartner provided an accelerated time line for “the eradication of
syphilis as a public health program.”58(p3). She said that if the compre-
hensive program recommended by the task force “can be secured and de-
veloped to the required level by 1963 . . . the epidemic spread of syphilis
in this country can be stopped within ten years.”58(p5) On the basis of the
task force’s report, President Kennedy in February 1962 recommended,
and Congress endorsed, what he termed “the initiation of amajor 10-year
program of Federal grants and direct action aimed at the total eradica-
tion in this country of this age-old scourge of mankind.”48(pp140-142),74
The goal of eradicating syphilis was reaffirmed by President Lyndon B.
Johnson after he assumed office.75 William Brown, chief of the Division
of Venereal Disease, said that even though to some people it may seem
like a pipe dream, the task can be accomplished, much like getting a
man to the moon, because we have reliable means of diagnosing and
treating syphilis.48(p141),60
Nonetheless, Terry’s plan failed. The rates of syphilis fell from 69
cases/100,000 when the campaign started in 1962 to fewer than 31
cases/100,000 in 1966 but then relapsed to its baseline by 1972, with
68 cases/100,000.76,77(p1823) Terry’s campaign failed to secure sustained
funding as syphilis was overtaken by other priorities.78 In 1966, the
task force, in fact, had expressed concern that the level of federal fund-
ing that was made available per year was insufficient to fully implement
all the program activities they recommended.48 But the lack of sustained
funding was not the sole reason for the campaign’s failure.79-81 Despite
Baumgartner’s attempts to define syphilis as a medical disease, it was
difficult to completely escape the moral framework that had prevented
some people from being tested or being reluctant to reveal their con-
tacts that compromised both her and Parran’s attempts to maximize
case finding.60 Also, we do not know how effective education had been
in moderating sexual behavior. Reformers from the social hygienists in
the 1920s to Baumgartner in the 1960s had faith that education was a
primary means of altering sexual behavior and that individuals would
cooperate, but the efficacy of this intervention for STDs has yet to be
verified. Furthermore, even though Baumgartner identified those social
issues that led to a vulnerable environment, she offered no specific ideas of
how to resolve them. Despite their ownwarnings to do otherwise, Baum-
gartner and Terry did not offer anything substantively new from earlier
eradication programs, and their campaigns suffered an identical fate.
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The Current UNAIDS Campaign:
Similarities to Syphilis Eradication
Programs
Today’s UNAIDS 90-90-90 plan is, in essence, an extension of Parran’s
and Terry’s failed anti-VD plans. Like syphilis eradication campaigns,
today’s UNAIDS campaign also calls for “new ways of operating” to end
the epidemic.1 But the 90-90-90 plan does not make specific provisions
for adding anything new, not in finding cases, retaining patients in care,
correcting social problems, or ensuring the financing needed to achieve
the goal of ending the epidemic. Like the earlier syphilis campaigns, the
UNAIDS plan specifies what needs to be done but lacks provisions to
accomplish it.
The key features of today’s UNAIDS plan are similar to those of earlier
20th-century syphilis campaigns. Its premise (treatment as prevention),
design (test and treat), and promises (eradicate HIV within an expedited
time span) are all similar to those of previous syphilis eradication plans.
The UNAIDS plan, like the syphilis eradication plans, emphasizes the
importance of carrying out widespread testing, getting all people into
treatment to render them noninfectious, and obtaining central subsidies
for their plan. According to the UNAIDS plan, “The world will need to
combine political will . . . and sufficient financial resources . . . to reach
the target [and] . . . to sustain lifelong HIV treatment for tens of mil-
lions worldwide.”1(p28) But the 90-90-90 plan does not provide specific
methods or offer procedures on how to achieve its targets of maximizing
case detection (eg, surveillance that is the backbone of public health
campaigns) and sustaining effective treatment for the entire life span
of all infected persons. Moreover, despite bringing the importance of
ending AIDS to the general public’s awareness, the UNAIDS plan fails
to stipulate how it will procure the sustained funding needed to carry
out the program for its duration. Thus, neither the syphilis campaigns
nor today’s AIDS plan shows how it can achieve the key targets they
identified—to diagnose all individuals and to retain them in care until
they are treated and rendered noninfectious—and to obtain the consis-
tent annual funding needed to achieve their goals within their accelerated
time span.
Neither the syphilis eradication plan nor the UNAIDS 90-90-90 plan
provides specific strategies to resolve the social problems that create
vulnerable environments and to overcome the moral framing of disease
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affecting case finding and retention in care. The UNAIDS plan does ad-
dress the social ills and moral framing that create a susceptible environ-
ment: “Urgent efforts are similarly needed to scale up other prevention
strategies, including . . . harm reduction services for people who inject
drugs . . . to eliminate stigma, discrimination and social exclusion.”1(p17)
But like the syphilis programs of the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, the
UNAIDS plan does not detail how to remedy these social problems,
which include poverty and poor access to health care for people who live
in remote areas. Thus, neither today’s UNAIDS plan nor the syphilis
programs that preceded it offer a comprehensive plan for how they would
overcome the moral, social, and biological factors impeding their goals,
or how they would sustain funding to reach their accelerated goals within
one generation (Parran in 1936), one decade (Terry in 1962), or 17 years
(UNAIDS plan in 2013).
The goals of today’s UNAIDS program, in fact, may be even more
challenging to achieve than those of earlier syphilis eradication efforts.
The global scale of the UNAIDS campaign, as well as the appearance of
new unexpected social and behavioral problems, add layers of complexity
to the national syphilis campaigns that preceded it. How, for example,
could a campaign be customized so that its message resonated with het-
erogeneous cultures in locales throughout the world? How could it adapt
to the ever-changing needs of regions that arise when populations are dis-
placed by war, disaster, or political instability? In addition, ART remains
a lifelong therapy, thereby adding another dimension to the already sig-
nificant challenges of sustained funding, retention in care, medicine ad-
herence, and loss to follow-up that are especially pertinent in countries
in sub-Saharan Africa that are battling overburdened health systems and
shortages of staff and medicine. The costs of ART both economically (up
to $3,000 monthly in industrialized nations) and physically (increased
risk of bone fracture and coronary disease associated with some agents
and medicines) accentuate these challenges.82 Furthermore, unexpected
HIV outbreaks, including one in a needle-sharing, multigenerational
rural population addicted to prescription narcotic drugs, underscore the
difficulties of HIV surveillance and treatment.83 These difficulties are
compounded by the burgeoning number of people under the influence of
drugs (eg, methamphetamine), leading to disinhibition and risk-taking
behaviors, and the growing popularity of soliciting anonymous partners
through the Internet.84 Finally, the admittedly “ambitious” target of
90% for case finding, treatment, and viral suppression specified by the
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UNAIDS plan is derived from mathematical modeling studies, but the
target is significantly higher than what has been actually demonstrated
in HIV treatment clinics across countries and regions worldwide.5 Thus,
a historical approach examining the failure of less ambitious campaigns
only deepens the skepticism voiced by some experts about whether the
goals of the UNAIDS 90-90-90 plan are attainable.3
But a historical approach also allows us to address a larger question:
is it feasible to talk about ending an STD epidemic at all? As Allan M.
Brandt observed, attempts to define venereal diseases in a framework of
scientific medicine has been only partially successful, as each remains
to some extent a symptom of moral failure.25(p160) The moral framing
of STDs, although diminished somewhat since the 1930s, has never
completely disappeared. It continues to threaten the process of finding
cases, reporting, and tracking contacts, which are indispensable public
health tools now referred to as “surveillance” that Parran and Baum-
gartner relied on to control the epidemic.63 Parran believed he could
capture cases and their contacts and bring them into treatment with
his “Wasserman Dragnet”; Baumgartner sought to improve on his plan
and to eliminate the “margin of failure”; and the target of the current
UNAIDS plan is to diagnose 90% of cases. But can any plan realisti-
cally state that it can diagnose the majority of infected individuals, even
those who may feel reluctant to be tested or to seek treatment, in the
face of the continued stigma associated with STDs? How can a campaign
convince an infected individual who may hesitate to reveal the names
of his or her sexual contacts, a secret that could shatter a relationship in
the infected person’s life? Can any campaign realistically plan to over-
come the hurdles that it would take to capture the majority of infected
people during their asymptomatic period so they are no longer infec-
tious? Finally, how can educational efforts control STDs if sexual activity
may not be subject to individual will or amenable to cognitive control
at all?85(p162) Efforts to end STDs are challenged by social concerns
(stigma deters people from testing), biologic factors (asymptomatic la-
tent periods of contagiousness), epidemiologic issues (difficulty tracking
contacts occurring in private settings), economic matters (lack of sus-
tainable funding), and the challenges of educational campaigns to curb
unsafe sexual behaviors. The distinctive arrays of socioeconomic, bio-
logic, and epidemiologic factors that characterize syphilis also apply to
AIDS andweaken the assumption that epidemics of STDs can be ended at
all.
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Does it matter whether the goals of any campaign to end STDs can
be achieved? One could argue that it does not matter because there
are indisputable benefits of campaigns to end STDs. The discourse of
eradication in itself is inspiring, as evidenced by how elected officials
who address it repeatedly invoke the sensational achievement of men
reaching the moon. The biologist Rene Dubos also noted the emotional
aspects of people’s yearning to control epidemic disease.86 As the AIDS
public health expert Wafaa El-Sadr pointed out, the prospect of en-
visioning a world without epidemic HIV can serve as a rallying call
for health care workers.87 When inspired, workers worldwide can bet-
ter focus their efforts on taming what some have called the scourge of
our time.17(pp250-255) According to this line of thinking, the prospect
of ending AIDS can galvanize multisectorial leaders to work together
to increase access to ART and reduce the incidence of HIV as much as
possible, a goal so laudable in itself that nobody could object if ending
the epidemic were not achieved. Indeed, it could be argued that earlier
syphilis eradication programs have demonstrated some degree of merit
simply by persuading some individuals to seek treatment who otherwise
would not have been persuaded and therefore temporarily diminishing
the spread of disease. Campaigns to end disease, in this line of thinking,
provide an undeniable benefit by exerting some control of the disease.
In contrast, declaring a goal of ending an epidemic when no explicit
methods have been outlined to ensure that its milestones can be reached
carries a potential downside. Initiating a campaign that is unlikely to
succeed can risk misleading workers. Individuals who tirelessly work on
achieving the goal can become disillusioned by unmet promises; lose
their motivation; become resigned, bewildered, and embittered; and po-
tentially curtail their efforts to continue working toward their goals.
This can be compounded when experts voice conflicting views about the
likelihood of ending the epidemic. Such a situation occurred in 2015,
when UNAIDS had already articulated its 90-90-90 plan. At that time,
Thomas R. Frieden, then director of the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, viewed the Austin, Indiana, outbreak as a “sentinel
event” because it had “a higher incidence of HIV than any country in
sub-Saharan Africa.”88 In addition, as El-Sadr explained, a discourse of
ending an epidemic could risk the withdrawal of resources by imply-
ing that disease elimination is forthcoming.87 Such a discourse could
paradoxically lead to a rebound in the HIV burden. Campaigns to end
AIDS that cannot be met can result in misinforming and alienating not
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only health care workers but also the donor countries and agencies that
subsidize the effort.
How can the UNAIDS proposal avoid this potential shortcoming?
One possibility would be to retain the present goal and truly attempt
“new ways of operating.” An “HIV Dragnet,” for example, could be
attempted to optimize case detection by implementing real-time, rapid
HIV testing in door-to-door settings or mobile testing units or by
using peer-driven recruitment (eg, in areas where stigma might other-
wise limit access).2 Incentive-based programs, including cash transfers,
could be considered to aid linkage to care and to promote adherence to
ART.2 Improved treatment for substance use disorders could be imple-
mented along with HIV treatment to boost adherence in the growing
subset of people with HIV infection and substance abuse problems.89
In addition, instituting structural HIV prevention programs (eg, uni-
versal needle exchange programs, decriminalization laws to protect the
rights of gay citizens, and legalization and regulation of brothels to
test and treat workers for STDs and ensure they are free of disease)
would reduce environmental vulnerability.90,91 The challenge of cus-
tomizing these interventions to local regions internationally, however,
is enormous, and the cost of subsidizing them globally would likely be
prohibitive. Designing a multifaceted program that includes explicit
proposals to increase case finding and retention in care and to address
social barriers to end the epidemic may therefore not be fundable or
attainable.
An alternative option for public health officials designing an AIDS
control program would be to discard the goal of ending the epidemic
altogether and to revert to using numerical goals of increasing ART dis-
tribution globally. This approach has repeatedly demonstrated success in
fulfilling its goals of expanding ART distribution globally in 2005 (the
“3 by 5” campaign) and again in 2015 (the “15 by 15” campaign). These
programs, moreover, have decreased mortality and reduced the number
of new cases worldwide. There is no reason to doubt that reinstituting
a UNAIDS program with the goal of increasing ART distribution to a
new numerical goal by a particular date (eg, the “25 by 25”) would offer
benefits to patients and the population that would be identical to those
of an eradication campaign. Moreover, reinstituting a numerical goal for
the next UNAIDS campaign would avoid the risk of misleading workers
and donor agencies—the potential downside of a failed campaign to end
AIDS.
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Scientists, doctors, and public health experts have speculated that a
cure, an effective vaccine, or both might be the biomedical breakthrough
required to accelerate the end of the AIDS epidemic.3,92,93 Undeniably,
both advances would be a welcome addition for treatment and preven-
tion. But there is no precedence for either one leading to ending an
STD epidemic. The failure of the single-dose penicillin cure to eradi-
cate the syphilis epidemic, for example, weakens the assumption that a
curative HIV drug, if available, could end the AIDS epidemic. Further-
more, one can examine the use of an effective vaccine against another
STD—HPV and its associated malignancies—as an indicator of what
the utilization of an HIV vaccine may be. The widespread usage needed
to end HPV-associated cancers has been hindered by heightened sexual
anxieties of parents who fear that giving the vaccine to their teenaged
sons or daughters would encourage promiscuity.94 The current vaccine
uptake (percentage of targeted population that is vaccinated) of 55% is
below the herd immunity (indirect protection of infection for the entire
population) required to protect those who have not been vaccinated, and
the malignancy remains prevalent.95 The same problems that have led
to not fully utilizing the HPV vaccine—reluctance to encourage sexual
behavior in targeted populations, including young teenagers—would
likely apply to other STDs, including HIV. Thus, the 90-90-90 goal of
ending AIDS may not be achievable even if a cure or an effective vaccine
were to become available.
Discourse of Ending HIV: A Fixture of
the HIV Epidemic
The repeated invocation of ending HIV throughout the AIDS epidemic
raises this question: Why has this utopian ideal persisted? The initial
discourse may have been a carryover of a widespread confidence in the
decades precedingAIDS that epidemics could become a thing of the past.
The success of antibiotics in treating bacterial infections that had pre-
viously been fatal, the elimination of polio in the Western Hemisphere,
and the elimination of smallpox globally with the use of vaccines were
able to reinforce the power of biomedical advances to handle infectious
epidemics.96 These advances of scientific medicine and technology bol-
stered the public’s and public health officials’ expectations that it was
within their power to forever banish plagues and epidemics of years
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past.97,98 But the confident expectation that it was only a matter of
time before epidemics were permanently conquered proved short-lived.
When AIDS appeared in 1981 and shattered the false sense of confidence
that epidemics had yielded to the laboratory’s discoveries, scientists were
mystified as to why the unexpected array of debilitating and perilous
infections occurred in healthy homosexual men, and they immediately
began to hunt for a microbial cause.99 In 1984 when this research led
to the discovery of the virus that causes AIDS, a discourse to end AIDS
resurfaced, renewing confidence in the powers of biomedicine to control
epidemic infections. The allure of this belief, fueled by the sensational
success in eradicating smallpox globally, has been so powerful for sci-
entists, elected officials, and public health experts that the discourse to
end AIDS endures today.
The success in eliminating smallpox, however, is not applicable to
HIV. The characteristics of diseases that have been eliminated (eg, small-
pox, rinderpest) or others that have been nearly extinguished (polio,
guinea worm disease [dracunculiasis]) are markedly different from those
of STDs like syphilis or AIDS. Smallpox, for example, has distinct bio-
logic properties: patients have a brief incubation period and only become
contagious afterward when they are visibly symptomatic. These biologic
features facilitate accurate case finding and eliminate the problems of
testing asymptomatic persons that apply to STDs. Furthermore, direct
spread to immediate household contacts facilitates accurate contact trac-
ing, as there are no intimate, behind-doors acts of transmission as occurs
with STDs. In addition, an effective vaccine is available when given
to exposed, uninfected persons, and so-called ring vaccination permits
a focused public health effort, as opposed to vaccination of an entire
at-risk population. Finally, although stigma is not absent from any dis-
ease, unlike STDs, the stigma associated with smallpox did not nullify
the basic public health tools needed to control smallpox: surveillance,
contact tracing, and vaccination at public health clinics. Because of the
differences of smallpox’s biological, epidemiological, and social char-
acteristics from those of syphilis and HIV, the success in eliminating
epidemics like smallpox is not applicable to STDs.
Similarly, the history of public health campaigns against non-STDs
has shown that the vastmajority are not suitable for elimination. Eradica-
tion campaigns were begun in the early 20th century by the Rockefeller
Foundation against hookworm disease in the southern United States and
also against yellow fever and malaria before World War II.100(pp49-97)
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Eradication was subsequently advocated by the World Health Orga-
nization (WHO), with campaigns against yaws, yellow fever, malaria,
and, more recently, poliomyelitis and guinea worm disease.101(pp1-18)
The malaria public health campaign illustrates why so few communica-
ble diseases are suitable for eradication: biological factors (development
of drug resistance in the microbe) combine with social and economic
conditions (migrating worker populations continuously exposed to
efficient vectors) to fuel recurrent epidemics, despite attempts to control
the disease with prophylaxis.102 Furthermore, even when campaigns ap-
proach success, they become so logistically complex that they require a
growing number of resources from international health foundations (eg,
UNICEF and WHO) and philanthropic organizations (eg, the Rocke-
feller Foundation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation).17(p7) That is,
the funding necessary to achieve disease eradication is not sustainable,
as it crowds out resources and attention from other public health priori-
ties. Consequently, some public health officials have questioned whether
pursuing the eradication of specific human diseases could worsen overall
health outcomes by depleting finances that could be used to improve
overall health (eg, programs to promote better nutrition, oral rehydra-
tion techniques to fight diarrheal diseases) or combat other important
diseases (eg, neglected tropical diseases) that are overlooked by an intense
concentration on ending epidemics of specific human diseases, whether
they be non-STDs, syphilis, or AIDS.103
Conclusion
The UNAIDS 90-90-90 program, like the syphilis programs before it,
has not provided a comprehensive plan of how it will achieve its treat-
ment objectives and accelerated goal of ending the respective epidemic.
By not including these provisions, today’s UNAIDS plan couldwellmeet
the fate of previous syphilis eradication campaigns, what Baumgartner
in 1962 referred to as “another crack at an old and familiar enemy.”
Today’s UNAIDS proposal, in this sense, has features that overlap with
the aspirational discourse to end AIDS present in the early phase of
the HIV epidemic. Moreover, the distinctive biological and socioeco-
nomic features of STDs like syphilis and HIV may make these diseases
unamenable to be conquered. The problem that Parran identified in
1936—that we have the medical and scientific knowledge in hand to
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end syphilis but we don’t know how to apply it—remains applicable to
HIV today. Similarly, the repeated trope of reaching the moon remains
relevant to today’s HIV control program. But the motivational purposes
for which it has been traditionally used may no longer be fitting. It may
bemore appropriate to say that science has assembled the spaceship capa-
ble of reaching its stellar goal of ending the HIV epidemic, but we don’t
yet know which switches to activate at mission control to land us there.
[Note: The archival papers of Parran and Baumgartner located at
USPHS were beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, these primary
archival sources might be valuable for future studies as they may shed
light on how Parran and Baumgartner arrived at the stated goals covered
in this paper. They may also lead to a better understanding of what
factors influenced them to emphasize certain interventions (eg, scientific
training) and deemphasize others (eg, condom use).]
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